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COMMENTS
THE NEW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES IN VIRGINIA
Under the traditional common law doctrine of necessaries, a husband
has the duty to support his wife' and is responsible for the cost of neces-
sary goods and services 2 furnished to his wife by third parties if he has
failed to provide the necessaries himself.3 However, the recent influx of
women into the marketplace and the United States Supreme Court's de-
cisions on gender discrimination4 have caused a significant number of
courts and state legislatures to modify the doctrine or abolish it
altogether.5
1. In summary, the duty of a husband to support his wife is a moral as well as a legal
obligation; it is a marital duty, in the performance of which the public as well as the
parties are interested; it is a duty which is incident to the marriage state and arises
from the relation of the marriage; and it is an inherent right which may be asserted in
a divorce suit or in an independent suit therefor.
Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 56, 245 S.E.2d 134, 139 (1978). See also Catlett v. Alsop, 99
Va. 680, 686-87, 40 S.E. 34, 36-37 (1901); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 368, 7 S.E.
335, 341 (1888); Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REv. 823
(1932).
2. See Taylor v. Taylor, 203 Va. 1, 3, 121 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1961); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 187
Va. 595, 600-01, 47 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1948). "Necessaries always include food, drink, shelter,
clothing, and medical attention. Some courts have gone beyond these bare essentials and
have extended a husband's liability to include any item of a necessary and suitable charac-
ter, given the social position, earning capacity, and lifestyle of the spouses." Ferry, Balsam
& Przybeck, Litigation of the Necessaries Doctrine: Funding for Battered Women's Shel-
ters, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1192, 1193 (1984). See also 41 An JuR. 2D Husband and Wife
§ 365 (1968).
3. See H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.3 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (workman's compen-
sation statute held unconstitutional because it required husbands but not wives to prove
mental or physical incapacity or dependency on a deceased spouse's earnings before a wid-
ower or widow could recover compensation for the spouse's death); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (state statute awarding alimony to a wife but not to a husband held unconstitu-
tional); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security
Act provision providing survivor's benefits to a widow regardless of dependency but provid-
ing such benefits to a widower only if he proved he had been receiving at least half of his
support from a deceased wife); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a statute
imposing a higher age requirement for males than females to buy beer was
unconstitutional).
5. See, e.g., Nichol v. Clema, 188 Neb. 74,, 195 N.W.2d 233, 235 (1972) (holding that a
wife is liable for medical services rendered to her husband during the time they were living
together); Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, ,
417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980) (holding that the common law doctrine of necessaries which
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
As time has passed and married women have asserted their legal status
in American society, the common law basis for the doctrine has lost credi-
bility. Consequently, states have modified the doctrine of necessaries in
one of four ways.' The four approaches differ in the extent and nature of
the wife's liability for necessaries furnished to her husband. Some courts
have considered the wife's liability under common law principles and in
light of public policy, while other courts have addressed it under statu-
tory or constitutional provisions.7
It was not until 1983 that Virginia modified its common law doctrine of
necessaries. In Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hospital, Inc.,8 the
Virginia Supreme Court declared the common law doctrine unconstitu-
tional. The General Assembly subsequently revised Virginia Code section
55-379 to make the doctrine equally applicable to both spouses,' 0 thus
removing the unconstitutional gender-based element of the doctrine.
This comment will analyze the court's decision in Schilling and the im-
pact of section 55-37 on the doctrine of necessaries. It will then explore
the direction that Virginia should take in applying section 55-37 in light
of the doctrine's treatment in other states.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES IN VIRGINIA
A. The Common Law Origin
At common law, the husband and wife were considered one legal en-
tity-their two identities merging upon marriage so that the husband's
protects a wife from liability for her husband's necessary expenses without according similar
protection to a husband constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws); Kurpiewski v.
Kurpiewski, 254 Pa. Super. 489, -, 386 A.2d 55, 57 (1978) (noting that the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment imposes a sex-neutral burden of support upon both spouses).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 75-113. There are some community property states
which represent exceptions to these four basic views. In those states, debts for necessaries
are chargeable to the marital property but must first be satisfied with community property.
If there is insufficient community property to pay the debts, one of the four modifications
will then be applied. See Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 123.090
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Gilman v. Matthews, 20 Colo. App. 170, -, 77 P. 366, 366-67 (1904) (holding
that under a statutory provision making the expenses of a family a charge upon the prop-
erty of both husband and wife, a wife was responsible for necessary clothing expenses of her
husband); Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 530-32, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018
(1981) (holding the common law doctrine of necessaries unconstitutional under the Mary-
land Equal Rights Amendment); Estate of Stromsted v. Saint Michael Hosp. of Franciscan
Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, -, 299 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1980) (holding that the husband should
be primarily responsible for costs of necessaries furnished to either spouse because income
of wives tends to be smaller than that earned by their husbands).
8. 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
10. Id.
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identity subsumed that of the wife." This merger left the married woman
legally incapable of incurring any obligations independent of her husband
so that she was completely dependent upon him for providing items nec-
essary to her maintenance. 2 In return, the wife gave her domestic ser-
vices and consortium to her husband. 13
The husband's duty of support included the cost of necessaries pro-
vided to his wife by third parties. 4 Liability was based on the husband's
presumed failure to provide the necessaries himself, or upon the theory
that the wife was acting as his agent when she bought the necessaries. 5 A
creditor could sell necessaries to the wife and rely upon the law to force
the husband to pay for them.'
6
In Virginia, the traditional common law view of the doctrine of neces-
saries was accepted as the basis for the husband's obligation to support
his wife and pay for her necessaries. 17 The definition of necessaries de-
pended primarily on the husband's financial ability" and his wife's
needs.' 9 Such needs included, among other things, last illness and burial
expenses.2 0
The wife's right to support and maintenance was not a property right
in Virginia, but a duty imposed by law that the husband could not con-
11. Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 176, 96 S.E. 315, 321 (1918) (Burks, J.,
concurring), overruled, Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971); see also W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971).
12. See Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE I-HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 404-05 (2d ed.
1898).
13. It is the duty of husband and wife to live together; each is entitled to the consortium
of the other, and that includes the right of companionship, the duty of each to be the
helpmeet of the other; each has the right to the society, comfort and affection of the
other.
Ballard v. Cox, 191 Va. 654, 662, 62 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1950).
14. Annot., 19 A.L.R.4th 432, 434 (1983) (discussing necessity of proving husband's failure
to provide necessaries in an action against the husband for necessaries furnished to his
wife).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See cases cited supra note 2; see also Bundy v. Bundy, 197 Va. 795, 91 S.E.2d 412
(1956); Ballard, 191 Va. 654, 62 S.E.2d 1; Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 28 S.E.2d 471 (1946).
18. Taylor v. Taylor, 203 Va. 1, 3, 121 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1961); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 187
Va. 595,'600-01, 47 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1948); Ring, 185 Va. at 274-75, 38 S.E.2d at 473.
19. Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 429, 107 S.E. 704, 706 (1921); see also Floyd v. Miller,
190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950); Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E.2d 471.
20. Hall v. Stewart, 135 Va. 384, 392-93, 116 S.E. 469, 472 (1923); see also Painter v.
Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S.E.2d 355 (1952) (husband obligated to provide his wife with the
means for recreation and pleasure); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 183 Va. 96, 97, 31 S.E.2d
284, 284 (1944) (requiring husband to "furnish a home wherein the wife is free from abuse,
ill treatment, and unwarranted interference from the members of the household.").
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tract away.21 Moreover, if a separation between spouses was the hus-
band's fault, third party creditors could still hold him liable for neces-
saries furnished to his wife.2 2 Of course, upon divorce the husband was no
longer responsible for his wife's necessaries beyond those obligations im-
posed pursuant to Virginia's alimony statutes. 2
B. The Married Women's Act
With the enactment of the Married Women's Acts24 in the mid-nine-
teenth century, the legal status of married women in the United States
began to change dramatically. Virginia's Married Women's Act,25 enacted
in 1877, severed the legal unity of spouses to allow married women to
separately control and own property, to sue or be sued in their own right,
and to make their own contracts independent of their husbands.2 6 How-
ever, prior to 1984, the Virginia Supreme Court did not interpret the
Married Women's Act or its modern successors27 as affecting the accepted
common law doctrine of necessaries.2 8 Instead the court reasoned that the
21. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 340, 10 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1940). But see McClung v. Mc-
Clung, 206 Va. 782, 146 S.E.2d 195 (1966) (wife may lose right to require her husband to
provide for her support and maintenance through marital misconduct).
22. It was the third party creditor's burden to prove that the husband was at fault for the
separation and thus still liable for necessaries furnished to a separated wife. See Mihalcoe,
130 Va. at 429-30, 107 S.E. at 706.
23. "In 1975, the General Assembly amended [Virginia] Code §§ 20-61 (the criminal non-
support statute) and 20-107 (providing for support of a spouse as part of a divorce suit) to
apply equally to husbands and wives." Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc.,
225 Va. 539, 542-43, 303 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1983).
24. See generally 41 AM. JuR. 21 Husband and Wife § 17 (1968).
25. 1876-77 Va. Acts ch. 329.
26. See Comment, The Legislative Abrogation of Interspousal Immunity in Virginia, 15
U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 940 (1981).
27. The modem successors to the Married Women's Act are at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-35 to
-37 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1984). Section 55-35 reads in part:
A married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of
property as if she were unmarried .... But neither her husband's right to curtesy
nor his marital rights shall entitle him to the possession or use, or to the rents, issues
and profits of such real estate during the coverture; nor shall the property of the wife
be subject to the debts or liabilities of the husband.
Id. § 55-35.
Section 55-36 provides in part: "A married woman may contract and be contracted with
and sue and be sued in the same manner and with the same consequences as if she were
unmarried . . . ." Id. § 55-36. Prior to 1984, section 55-37 provided: "A husband shall not
be responsible for any contract, liability, or tort of his wife, whether the contract or liability
was incurred or the tort was committed before or after marriage." Id. § 55-37.
28. Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 542, 303 S.E.2d 905,
907 (1983); see also Floyd v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 306-09, 57 S.E.2d 114, 116-17 (1950) (con-
struing predecessor of Virginia Code Section 55-37 as not affecting the application of the
common law doctrine of necessaries). The Married Women's Statutes do not affect the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries because "the doctrine creates an obligation directly between
the husband and the third party who provided services. This being so, the husband is liable
[Vol. 19:317
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doctrine created an obligation directly between the husband and the
creditor as a matter of personal indebtedness, and thus was not affected
by contracts between the wife and the creditor.28
C. The Effect of the United States Supreme Court's Gender-Discrimi-
nation Decisions
Before 1971, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of any law containing gender-based classifications whenever the law
was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.30 Under this
test, broad deference was given to the legislative determination that the
law was in fact reasonably related to such a purpose.3 1 Consequently,
most laws challenged under this early standard were upheld as constitu-
tional.2 These decisions reflected the "romantic, paternalism" firmly
rooted in society that females were destined to be mothers and wives who
needed special protection under the laws.33
As women made gains in terms of income level and entrance into the
job market, the Supreme Court recognized that "[n]o longer is the female
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. 3 4 In Craig v. Boren,3 5
the Court established an intermediate scrutiny test to apply to laws that
are challenged as being gender-discriminatory. The Court held that "[tlo
withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives."36 Under this new and more
stringent standard, the law must relate to an "important" governmental
purpose, as opposed to a "legitimate" purpose, and must have a "substan-
tial" relation, rather than a mere "reasonable" relation, to the achieve-
ment of that governmental objective.
The heightened scrutiny accorded gender-based laws led many state
legislatures and courts to reject or modify the common law doctrine of
necessaries as it then existed in their jurisdictions.37 Although it is clear
that the United States Supreme Court considered support of a needy
on his personal indebtedness, not on a contract between the wife and the service provider."
Id.
29. Schilling, 225 Va. at 542, 303 S.E.2d at 907.
30. See Note, Inequity in Marital Liabilities: The Need for Equal Protection When
Modifying the Necessaries Doctrine, 17 U. MicaL JL. REF. 43, 48 (1983).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
34. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
35. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
36. Id. at 197.
37. See cases cited supra note 5.
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spouse to be an important governmental objective, 38 most states that have
considered the constitutional question have decided that placing upon the
husband the responsibility for a wife's necessaries is not an act substan-
tially related to achievement of that important objective.3 9
By allowing the wife to escape liability for the cost of necessaries she
has purchased for herself, the common law doctrine discriminates against
the husband under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.40 The means employed by the doctrine are not substantially related
to the goal of providing for needy spouses because the doctrine fails to
include needy husbands (underinclusive), it benefits non-needy wives
(overinclusive), and there are at least three gender-neutral alternatives to
achieving that goal.4
Although most of the gender-discrimination decisions were handed
down by the United States Supreme Court in the -1970's,," it was not until
1983 that the Virginia Supreme Court dealt with the common law doc-
trine of necessaries in light of those decisions. The opportunity presented
itself in Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hospital, Inc.41
II. THE ROOTS OF THE NEW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES IN Schilling v.
Bedford County Memorial Hospital, Inc.
A. Facts
Mrs. Schilling received necessary medical services from Bedford
County Memorial Hospital on four occasions in 1977 and 1978. Upon each
admission to the hospital, she signed a promissory note which, upon dis-
charge, was filled in by the hospital in the amount of its charges. At the
time, Mrs. Schilling was living with her husband and both were unem-
ployed. Mr. Schilling's only significant asset was the real estate where he
and his wife lived. Mrs. Schilling had no assets. When requested to do so,
Mr. Schilling refused to guarantee payment of his wife's expenses, al-
though he testified at trial that his wife had always paid her medical bills
with money he provided. Nevertheless, the hospital followed its general
policy and listed Mr. Schilling as "guarantor" of his wife's account. Mrs.
Schilling later died and the hospital sued Mr. Schilling for the cost of
services rendered to his wife.
44
38. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 280 (1979).
39. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see generally cases cited supra note 4.
41. Note, supra note 30, at 52-56.
42. See cases cited supra note 4.
43. 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983).
44. Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 541, 303 S.E.2d 905,
906 (1983).
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The trial court granted judgment for the hospital in the amount
claimed, holding that Mr. Schilling was liable for his wife's bills under the
doctrine of necessaries. 45 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court's decision and held that the common law doctrine of
necessaries was unconstitutional.46
B. Analysis
After deciding that the doctrine of necessaries was applicable to the
case,47 the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
common law doctrine violated article I, section 11 of the Virginia Consti-
tution48 and the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.4 9 Mr. Schilling contended that the doc-
trine was unconstitutional as applied at common law because it contained
a discriminatory gender-based classification that did not serve an impor-
tant governmental objective and was not substantially related to the
achievement of that objective.5"
As previously noted,5 the United States Supreme Court had estab-
lished that, in order for a gender-based classification to be constitutional,
the classification must serve an important governmental objective and be
substantially related to the achievement of that objective.52 Utilizing this
test, the Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that, although prompt and ef-
ficient medical service is a legitimate and important state concern, the
gender-based classification does not substantially relate to the promotion
of this interest and is, therefore, unconstitutional.53 By imposing financial
45. Id. at 541, 303 S.E.2d at 906. The trial court held as an alternative ruling that Schil-
ling was liable under an agency theory, in that his wife pledged his credit with the apparent
authority to do so. The Virginia Supreme Court said that this holding was not supported by
credible evidence and therefore could not stand. Id.
46. Id. at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
47. Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 544, 303 S.E.2d 905,
908 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-29. The court rejected the hospital's
contention that by amending Virginia Code sections 20-61 (criminal nonsupport statute)
and 20-107 (providing for support of a spouse as part of a divorce suit) to apply equally to
husbands and wives, the General Assembly had by implication also amended the necessaries
doctrine to be gender-neutral. Schilling, 225 Va. at 542-43, 303 S.E.2d at 907. See also VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cune. Supp. 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
48. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11. "[A]nd that the right to be free from any governmental dis-
crimination upon the basis of religions conviction, race, color, sex, or national origin shall
not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered dis-
crimination." Id.
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "[Nlor shall any State... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
50. Schilling, 225 Va. at 543, 303 S.E.2d at 907.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
52. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
53. Schilling, 225 Va. at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
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liability on the husband for necessary expenses, the doctrine only benefits
the wife and does nothing to encourage the prompt and efficient treat-
ment of a hospital's married male patients. 5
4
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has struck
down a number of statutes which provided unequal benefits to men and
women on the assumption that women were financially dependent upon
men.5 5 In those cases, the United States Supreme Court explained that
gender-based classifications cannot be justified on the bases of "archaic
and overbroad generalizations,"56 "old notions," 57 and "role-typing", 8
which conclude that the wife plays a dependent role, while the husband's
primary responsibility is to provide for the family.59 The Virginia Su-
preme Court concluded that the common law doctrine of necessaries has
its roots in the same outdated assumptions concerning proper male aiid
female roles in society, and declared the doctrine unconstitutional.6 0 The
judgment of the trial court was reversed and final judgment entered for
Mr. Schilling.6 1
Rather than declare the doctrine unconstitutional, the hospital urged
the court to simply extend the doctrine to apply to wives as well as to
husbands. The court refused to do so, noting that extension of the doc-
trine, if advisable, was a task for the General Assembly. 2 This decision
paved the way for the 1984 amendment to Virginia Code section 55-37
which extended the doctrine to both spouses, and thus created a new doc-
trine of necessaries in Virginia.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also cases cited supra note 4.
56. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211-12 (1977) (striking down a statute providing
unequal benefits to men and women on the assumption that women were more financially
dependent).
57. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975) (striking down a statute providing for child
support to males for a longer period of time than females).
58. Id. at 14-15.
59. Id.
60. Schilling, 225 Va. at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
61. Id.
62. Id. Although the court had held in the past that, where possible, it would rely on
Virginia's Constitution rather than referring to that of the United States, its analysis was
the same under both Constitutions in this case because article I, section 11 of the Virginia
Constitution is no broader than the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
543, 303 S.E.2d at 907. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574,
588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (1981); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711
(1973).
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III. THE STATUTORY CREATION OF THE NEW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES
IN VIRGINIA
In April 1984, through revision of Virginia Code section 55-37,63 the
Virginia General Assembly extended the common law doctrine of neces-
saries to apply equally to both spouses. This extension removed the un-
constitutional gender-based element of the doctrine which the Virginia
Supreme Court attacked in Schilling. The General Assembly gave the
doctrine a new life in a constitutionally gender-neutral form.
Prior to 1984, section 55-37 of the Virginia Code stated: "A husband
shall not be responsible for any contract, liability or tort of his wife,
whether the contract or liability was incurred or the tort committed
before or after marriage."'" As discussed previously, 5 this statute had no
effect on the old common law doctrine of necessaries.
The 1984 amendment added the following language to the existing
statute:
The doctrine of necessaries as it existed at common law shall apply equally
to both spouses, except where they are permanently living separate and
apart. No lien arising out of a judgment under this section shall attach to
the judgment debtors' principal residence held by them as tenants by the
entireties.68
The language used by the General Assembly in Virginia Code section
55-37 creates a problem when one attempts to interpret the precise mean-
ing of the statute. The statute states that the doctrine "shall apply
equally to both spouses." 7 However, this wording is ambiguous because it
simply declares that the doctrine of necessaries itself shall be applied to
male and female spouses alike, but leaves unaddressed the specific nature
and degree of liability to be borne by each spouse for the cost of neces-
saries incurred by one spouse. To respond to this ambiguity it will be
necessary for the Virginia courts to adopt one of the four existing ap-
proaches to the new doctrine of necessaries.6 8 The approach selected
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
64. Id.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29. Under the Married Women's Acts, it has
been generally recognized that a wife may bind her separate estate by contract for neces-
saries although these statutes do not specifically touch on the liability of a wife for neces-
saries absent an express contractual understanding or agreement. Annot., 20 A.L.R.4th § 2,
at 196 (1983).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
67. Id.
68. At least a handful of states appear to adhere to the doctrine of necessaries as it ex-
isted at common law. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown, 50 N.C.
App. 526, , 274 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1981) (holding a separated husband liable for his wife's
medical expenses); Bowes v. Bowes, 43 N.C. App. 586, , 259 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1979) (citing
the common law doctrine), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 5 (1980); Banker v. Dodge,
19851
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should serve the needs of both the family and the creditor.
In analyzing which approach Virginia should take, it is helpful to ex-
amine the four approaches other states have taken to either modify or
abolish the common law doctrine of necessaries."' The first and most
common approach is to hold both spouses jointly and severally liable for
the necessaries of either spouse. This view is most often adopted in states
through "family expense" statutes, by equal rights amendments, or by
statutes enacted to deal specifically with the question of necessaries. 70
The second approach is to hold neither spouse liable for necessaries fur-
nished to the other spouse in the absence of an express or implied con-
tract.71 The third approach is to hold the husband primarily responsible
and the wife secondarily responsible for payment of necessaries furnished
to either spouse.7 2 The fourth approach is to hold a spouse responsible for
the necessaries of the other spouse only if the resources of the spouse
incurring the debt are insufficient to pay it.73
A. Joint and Several Liability
The joint and several liability approach has been the subject of criti-
cism since its adoption.7 4 In Cooke v. Adams, 75 the Mississippi Supreme
126 Vt. 534, -, 237 A.2d 121, 123 (1967) (indicating in dictum that a husband may be
primarily liable for his wife's medical expenses); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 404.040 (Baldwin
1983) (codifying common law doctrine).
69. For a summary of the current legal status of the doctrine of necessaries in every state,
see Ferry, Balsam & Przybeck, supra note 2, at 1195-1200.
70. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1015 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (Equal Rights Amendment);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (West 1981) (no Equal Rights Amendment). For a more complete
discussion of this approach, see infra text accompanying notes 75-87.
71. See, e.g., Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981). For
a more complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 102-104.
72. See, e.g., Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976) (interpreting
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-10 (1981)); Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 229, 95 N.W.2d 545 (1959);
Klump v. Klump, 96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 (1954); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105
Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of holding the husband
primarily liable for either spouse's necessaries); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-22 (1980). For a more
complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 88-101.
73. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1982) (married woman
held liable for own debts in her own behalf, then her husband secondarily liable if the wife
is unable to pay); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Jersey Shore
Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980); see also
Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding the doctrine of necessaries unconstitutional as an invalid gender based classifica-
tion but expressly leaving open the question of whether the spouse not incurring the debt is
liable only if the spouse incurring the debt is unable to pay); Note, Equal Protection and
Spousal Debt: Novel Application of Necessaries Doctrine, 11 STETSON L. REv. 173 (1981).
For a more complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 105-13.
74. See Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp., 84 N.J. at _ 417 A.2d at 1009 (stat-
ing that joint and several liability would result in the immediate exposure of one spouse's
property for a debt incurred by the other spouse, thus giving a creditor the same benefits as
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Court held that, in the absence of an express agreement, a married wo-
man should be held jointly and severally liable with her husband for
necessaries obtained for her own personal use or benefit under circum-
stances which would imply a contract on her part for such goods and ser-
vices.76 The court reasoned that women today are often the "breadwin-
ners" and have incomes and estates equal to those of their husbands." As
a result, the court ruled that a physician could seek recovery for medical
expenses from a deceased wife's estate.78
Another theory used to justify joint and several liability is that a wife's
contract is personal and independent of the refusal or inability of her
husband to supply her and her children with necessaries. 9 Regardless of
the noncontracting spouse's reason for inability or refusal to pay for
necessaries, the contracting spouse is deemed to act for the benefit of
both spouses, who are considered to be one economic unit. Therefore,
both spouses should be held jointly and severally liable for necessaries.8 0
Although joint and several liability would certainly treat both spouses
equally, it would be "equality with a vengeance."'" It would result in the
immediate exposure of one spouse's property for a debt incurred by the
other spouse, giving the creditor the same benefits as if both spouses had
agreed to joint liability. 2 As one court has noted, "[n]either equity nor
reality justifies imposing unqualified liability on one spouse for the debts
of the other or exempting one spouse from liability for the necessary ex-
penses of the other.183
Should Virginia choose the joint and several liability approach, it would
result in a hard and fast rule that does not take into consideration the
financial circumstances and abilities of the individual spouses.84 This ap-
proach strikes a great imbalance in favor of creditors by giving creditors
equal access to the dependent spouse, who may have few or no assets,
even though the independent spouse incurred the debt for the neces-
saries.8 5 This imbalance tends to ignore the reality that spouses differ in
their ability to pay for necessaries and does not take into account which
spouse actually incurred the debt.' Joint and several liability reduces the
if both spouses had agreed to joint and several liability).
75. 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966).
76. Id. at 926-27.
77. Id. at 927.
78. Id.
79. See Daggett v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 348 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
80. Id. at 800.
81. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp., 84 N.J. at _, 417 A.2d at 1009.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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new doctrine of necessaries to a creditor's remedy, losing the support pur-
pose of the doctrine in the process.8s
B. Primary Liability on the Husband
Other jurisdictions have held the husband primarily responsible and
the wife secondarily responsible for necessaries regardless of which spouse
incurred the debt.8 In Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hospital of
Franciscan Sisters,"9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to hold the
wife primarily liable for the cost of necessaries, even though it agreed
with the hospital that, in modern society, "women have become familiar
components of the business and professional world." 90 The court was not
convinced that a husband and wife should bear this liability as a joint
and several obligation because statistics showed that married women re-
mained behind their husbands as an income-producing element of the
family.9 1 The court decided that the husband, typically the principal in-
come-producer of the family, must continue to be viewed as having pri-
mary liability for the necessaries of his household and, to the extent that
the husband is unable to satisfy his obligation, the creditor may seek sat-
isfaction from the wife.92 Accordingly, the court ruled that a hospital
could not prevail against a decedent's wife because it was not alleged that
the hospital first attempted unsuccessfully to obtain satisfaction from the
decedent's estate for his medical bills.98
Two years later, the same court, in Marshfield Clinic v. Discher,9 4 held
that the ruling in Stromsted was constitutional because the necessaries
doctrine benefits families by making it more likely that they will obtain
important and appropriate goods and services.95 Moreover, the court rea-
soned that this approach protects wives who are not economically equal
to their husbands, and enables wives to obtain credit more easily.96 The
court believed that placing primary liability on the husband for neces-
87. Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136,
299 N.W.2d 226, 232-33 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
88. See supra note 71.
89. 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
90. Id. at -, 299 N.W.2d at 229-30.
91. Id. at -, 299 N.W.2d at 230-31. The court relied on 1978 labor statistics from the
Office of Special Labor Force Studies, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, in
Washington, D.C. which indicated wives earned only 26% of family income on the average.
Id. at __n.7, 299 N.W.2d at 230-31 n.7. But see Note, supra note 30, at 55 (stating that in
52% of all families, the wife is at most only partially dependent on the husband and that in
3.5% of all married couple families, the wife is the only wage earner. This means that poten-
tially 1,707,000 husbands are totally dependent on their wives).
92. Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at _ 299 N.W.2d at 230.
93. Id. at -, 299 N.W.2d at 231.
94. 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).
95. Id. at , 314 N.W.2d at 328-29.
96. Id.
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saries is substantially related to the achievement of important goals be-
cause creditors will be more willing to extend their services if either
spouse can be held liable for them .
7
If Virginia were to adopt this view, it would ignore dependent husbands
and "demean the efforts of working wives by perpetuating the stereotypic
view that the wife is the dependent spouse."'98 Although women, as a
class, do tend to earn less than men, it does not follow that the wife is
always dependent on her husband and thus needy.9
Since Virginia has already decided that the common law doctrine of
necessaries is to apply equally to both spouses, it is highly unlikely that
the Virginia Supreme Court would construe Virginia Code section 55-37
as placing primary liability on the husband for necessaries. It is clear that
the General Assembly wanted to create a sex-neutral scheme to remove
the element of unconstitutional gender-based discrimination found to ex-
ist in the common law doctrine of necessaries in Schilling.
The approach holding the husband primarily responsible is the only
approach that continues to use gender as a factor in determining liability
for necessaries, and it would be contradictory for the court to adopt the
approach in light of its language concerning the financial dependency of
spouses in relation to gender-based classifications. 100 The other three ap-
proaches have the advantage of being gender-neutral, at least on their
face, and thus less susceptible to constitutional challenge.
10 1
C. Neither Spouse Liable
The neither spouse liable approach states that, absent an express or
implied contract, each spouse is responsible for only his or her individual
debt, regardless of the other spouse's ability to pay. Though each spouse
may enjoy the benefits of necessaries contracted for, only the contracting
spouse is liable for the cost of those necessaries.
It is unlikely that the Virginia Supreme Court would adopt an ap-
proach holding neither spouse liable for necessaries furnished to the other
spouse in the absence of express or implied contract. Section 55-37 makes
the doctrine of necessaries equally applicable to both spouses, a task the
Virginia Supreme Court specifically left to the General Assembly.
0 2
Moreover, if neither spouse were ever liable for necessaries furnished to
97. Id.
98. Note, supra note 30, at 56.
99. Id. at 55.
100. See Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 543-44, 303
S.E.2d 905, 908 (1983).
101. See supra accompanying notes 30-42.
102. Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc. 225 Va. 539, 544, 303 S.E.2d 905,
908 (1983).
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the other, creditors would have no recourse because they could not collect
from a financially independent spouse the cost of necessaries sold to a
financially dependent spouse. 10 3 This view, though certainly gender-neu-
tral, also overlooks the fact that husbands and wives, whether they con-
tribute income or domestic services, are a financial unit.04
D. Debt-Incurring Spouse Primarily Liable
This final approch embraces the view that, while both spouses are lia-
ble for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse in the course of a
marriage, a judgment creditor must first seek satisfaction from the spouse
who incurred the debt. In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital
v. Estate of Baum, 05 the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this ap-
proach and held that, unless there was an agreement otherwise, the in-
come and property of one spouse will not be exposed to satisfy a debt
incurred by the other spouse unless the assets of the spouse who incurred
the debt are insufficient to pay the debt. 06 The court reasoned that, in a
viable marriage, the marital partners can decide between themselves how
to pay their own debts, and a creditor providing necessaries to one spouse
should not be able to assume that the financial resources of both spouses
are automatically available for payment to the same degree. 10 7
This view is fair to creditors in that they can at least assume that, in
some combination, the resources of both spouses can be used to pay the
debt incurred by one spouse if the assets of that spouse alone are insuffi-
cient to cover the full amount of the debt.108 While normally a person is
not liable for the debt of another in the absence of an agreement, the
marriage relationship provides an exception in that both spouses' incomes
benefit that partnership. 09
If Virginia were to adopt this view, it would strike a fair balance be-
tween the rights of creditors and the spouses' economic circumstances.
This approach protects creditors because they know that they will be able
to collect from the financially independent spouse in the event that the
103. See Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, -,
417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980).
104. Id.
105. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). In this case, a hospital brought an action against a
wife for the last illness expenses of her deceased husband. After deciding that the doctrine
of necessaries was an unconstitutional gender-based classification, the court ruled that the
spouse who incurs the necessary expense should be primarily liable for the debt and the
other spouse only secondarily liable. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment
in favor of the widow because she had a right to rely on the traditional application of the
doctrine as it existed prior to this decision. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 1010-11.
106. Id. at , 417 A.2d at 1005.
107. Id. at , 417 A.2d at 1010.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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financially dependent spouse cannot pay. Creditors will be more likely to
extend credit for necessaries to dependent spouses under these circum-
stances, and a substantial degree of protection will be afforded to the de-
pendent spouse who did not incur the debts of a financially independent
spouse.11
Marshalling the marital resources in this way grants some protection to
a spouse who has not expressly consented to a debt. Furthermore, this
approach does not unfairly accord the same rights to a creditor who has
an agreement with only one spouse as it does to a creditor who has an
agreement with both spouses."1 ' More importantly, this approach is a
gender-neutral plan that comports with the Virginia Supreme Court's de-
cision in Schilling""2 and still makes the common law doctrine of neces-
saries equally applicable to both spouses under Virginia Code section 55-
37113 while taking into account which spouse incurred the debt.
IV. CONCLUSION
Virginia should adopt the approach to the new doctrine of necessaries
which holds that one spouse will be liable for the necessaries of the other
spouse only if the resources of the spouse who incurred the debt are in-
sufficient to pay for the necessaries. This is the only existing view that
takes into account both the creditor's rights and the economic circum-
stances of the spouses involved while at the same time providing for a
gender-neutral, constitutional application of the doctrine. It serves the
needs of creditors by establishing a procedure by which they can collect
from spouses for necessaries provided to one spouse while protecting
those most in need of support-the dependent spouses.
11 4
Under any of the views, there is always the unfortunate possibility that
the spouse who has contributed domestic services to the family and who
has few or no assets may be converted into a guarantor of payment for
necessaries provided to the other spouse and the children. However,
under the circumstances, this last approach strikes the most equitable
balance between the competing interests.
Mark S. Brennan
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Schilling, 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
114. Id. Virginia's modification of the doctrine also affords a significant degree of protec-
tion to the spouses in that it protects their tenancy by the entireties from the grasp of
judgment creditors. Moreover, the modification also alters application of the common law
doctrine of necessaries so that neither spouse will be liable for the necessaries of the other
spouse if they are permanently living apart, regardless of which spouse was at fault in the
separhtion. Id. § 55-37 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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